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In cross-cultural research there is an increasing interest in the comparison of constructs at different levels of aggregation, such as the use of individualism—collectivism at individual and country level. A procedure is described for establishing structural equivalence (i.e., similarity of psychological meaning) at various levels of aggregation, based on exploratory factor analysis. A construct shows structural equivalence across aggregation levels if its factor structure is invariant across levels. The procedure was applied to the Postmaterialism scale of the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1993, 1997). The similarity of postmaterialism at individual and country level could not be unambiguously demonstrated; a likely reason is that the concept does not have an identical meaning in countries with low and high GNP. 
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Equivalence in Aggregating and Disaggregating Data

	Aggregation and disaggregation issues have a rich history in the social sciences (e.g., Achen & Shively, 1995; Hannan, 1971). Yet, with the advent of cross-cultural psychological research, a new type of problem has emerged (Leung & Bond, 1989). Traditionally, equivalence has been studied at within-country level; the study of structural equivalence usually addresses to what extent an instrument administered in different cultural groups measures the same underlying construct(s) in individuals belonging to each of these groups. Multilevel and cross-level models deal with another type of equivalence, namely the comparability of individual-level and country-level differences. We need a framework to deal with the following problem that has been presented in various forms (the present version is adapted from Sandra Scarr): When maize has grown on two plots with different soil structure and nutrients, the maize plants will show intra- and interplot differences. Intraplot differences are mostly due to individual (genetic) differences between the maize plants, whereas interplot differences are mainly caused by environmental differences. Translated to cross-cultural psychology, the example illustrates that differences in scores obtained by individuals of a single culture (Scarr’s intraplot differences) and cross-cultural differences (interplot differences) may well have a different meaning. This shift in meaning due to aggregation may occur even when structural or measurement unit equivalence has been shown at individual level (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, b). Equivalence at individual level is a necessary but insufficient condition for cross-level equivalence. 
The present paper formulates a methodological approach to the problem of a shift in meaning in multilevel studies, based on Muthén’s (1991, 1994) multilevel factor analysis (see also Hox, 1993). In the next section a classification of errors in multilevel research is presented. The third section mentions various meaning shifts that occur in multilevel research. In the fourth section an approach is described, based on multilevel factor analysis, to deal with meaning similarity in multilevel research. In the fifth section an example is given. Some implications are discussed in the last section. 

A Taxonomy of Aggregation and Disaggregation Errors
Even when there is no shift of meaning with (dis)aggregation, cross-level inferences are susceptible to problems. Thus, observed country differences on some psychological characteristic often have a limited predictive value at individual level. If more women are pregnant in one group than in another, the difference in the proportions does not help much to distinguish individual women in the two groups (just like the proportion of pregnant women in one group is a number that does not apply to any specific woman in that group). If at least one but not all women in a group are pregnant, the proportion of pregnancies is a number that does not apply to any specific woman of the group. 
As another example, suppose that a traveler randomly chosen from an individualist country goes to a collectivist country and the traveler, knowing this, wonders how likely it is that a randomly chosen person whom he/she meets will be more collectivist. Assuming that the difference in country means is 1 SD and that scores follow a normal distribution with equal variances, this probability, known as the common language statistic (McGraw & Wong, 1992; Matsumoto, Grissom, & Dinnel, in press), is .76. Thus, the traveler is quite likely to make a mistake when indiscriminately applying a country-level characteristic at individual level. It may be noted that differences in psychological variables between countries that exceed 1 SD are fairly rare in cross-cultural psychology, unless they reflect very specific customs or rules. For example, in a meta-analysis of cross-cultural differences in cognitive test performance, Van de Vijver (1997) reported a median difference of .5 SD. Smaller differences in means increase the number of errors the traveler will make.
This example illustrates one type of disaggregation error. For multilevel research a taxonomy of aggregation and disaggregation errors can be constructed that is based on two dimensions. The first refers to the distinction between errors of structure and level errors. This dimension is parallel to the common distinction between structure- and level-oriented statistical techniques (e.g., Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, b). In the former there is an emphasis on the representation of the structure underlying data with techniques such as factor analysis, multidimensional scaling, and cluster analysis. In level-oriented techniques there is an emphasis on the comparison of score levels using mainly t tests and analyses of variance. Analogously, a structure error refers to the application of a concept at a level, to which it does not apply, while a level error refers to the incorrect attribution of a score value from one aggregation level to another.
	The second dimension refers to the distinction between aggregation and disaggregation. An aggregation error is committed when characteristics of a lower hierarchical level of aggregation (e.g., a person) are incorrectly attributed to some higher level (e.g., an organization or country). A disaggregation error is made when a higher-order characteristic is incorrectly attributed to a lower order. 
	Crossing the two dimensions, which are dichotomized here for simplicity of presentation, yields four kinds of fallacies (see Table 1). Type I and II constitute the structure fallacies. Type I involves structure aggregation fallacies; characteristics of lower-order units are incorrectly applied at higher-order units. Entwistle and Mason (1985; see also Diprete & Forristal, 1994, p. 345) studied the relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility. They found a relationship between a country’s affluence and the total number of children born. However, in low affluent countries there tends to be a positive relationship between status and fertility, while in high affluent countries a negative relationship is often found. A Type II error is committed when a higher level structure is applied to a lower level of aggregation. An example of a study in which a Type II error explicitly was avoided can be found in Triandis et al. (1988; see also Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995). These authors distinguish between individualism and collectivism at country level and between idiocentrism and allocentrism at individual level.
In Type III and Type IV fallacies score levels are incorrectly applied to units at a lower or higher order. The dissimilar nature of within- and between-plot differences of the maize mentioned before provides an example of a Type III error. Richards, Gottfredson, and Gottfredson (1990/1991) coined the term “individual differences fallacy” to refer to conditions in which data obtained from individuals do not apply to the aggregate. An example of a Type IV error is the inapplicability of the percentage of pregnant women in a group as a score to any individual woman, as described before. This error is commonly known as the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950; cf. also Hofstede, 1980).

Meaning Shifts Due to Aggregation and Disaggregation Errors
	Whether or not the meaning of a construct changes after (dis)aggregation is an empirical question. The framework presented here does not specify when to expect invariance or variation of meaning, but indicates how to compare individual- and culture-level structures of data. In particular when inherently broad psychological constructs such as personality traits, attitudes, or cognitive abilities are aggregated and conclusions about country differences are drawn, it is important to examine the meaning of the data at aggregated level. 
	Such an examination may show (near) identity of meaning at individual and country level. This can indeed be concluded when individual- and country-level factor structures (in factor analyses) show a high agreement. Such a high agreement is a necessary and sufficient condition for the structural equivalence of an instrument at different levels of aggregation. From a psychological perspective this finding is straightforward, as constructs convey the same meaning across aggregation levels. This conclusion is implicitly taken for granted when the multilevel similarity of factors is not examined and the same construct is used to interpret individual- and country-level differences. It is probably not always realized that comparisons of culture- and individual-level data always involve (des)aggregation. Even a simple t test of scores obtained in two different cultures involves aggregation from individual to cultural level; as a consequence, a shift of meaning is possible (cf. cross-cultural differences in social desirability on a personality questionnaire which only becomes prominent after score aggregation). It is unfortunate that an empirical check, which is required to examine the tenability of the assumption is infrequently carried out in contemporary culture-comparative studies. 
	If there is no close agreement between individual- and country-level structures, different constructs are needed to describe individual- and country-level differences. The large variety of possible outcomes is reduced here to three categories. A first possibility is observed when items show a different, but meaningful clustering on the individual and national level. Suppose that an intelligence test consists of four subtests: the first two deal with fluid intelligence and the second half with crystallized intelligence. These types of intelligence are crossed with two stimulus modes: the fist and third test deal with verbal stimuli, and the second and fourth with figures. It is not inconceivable that within each country the same two correlated factors will be found (viz. fluid and crystallized intelligence), but that a between-country factor analysis yields factors related to the stimulus modes and shows a verbal and a figure factor. Different constructs are then needed to describe within- and between-country differences.
	A special case of meaningful differences in clustering occurs when individual-level factors merge at country level. As a hypothetical example, suppose that a two-factorial assertiveness inventory has been administered in various countries. The same two-factorial structure is found within each country: assertiveness in cooperative relationships and in competitive relationships. Now suppose that the countries have differences in norms about displaying modesty in situations described in the items of the inventory. Cross-national differences in social desirability are then likely to affect all items and to lead to a strong first factor at the country level. Another example would be cross-national differences in stimulus familiarity of items in a set of mental tests. The various factors of a within-country structure may merge when there are substantial cross-national differences in stimulus familiarity. In both examples different constructs apply to the explanation of individual differences (within each country) and country differences.
	A second possible outcome occurs when the factor analysis results in a meaningful structure at one level only. For example, within-country data yield a theoretically expected structure, but the between-country structure cannot be interpreted. Such a finding demonstrates the unsuitability of the instrument for cross-cultural comparison. A seemingly meaningless pattern of between-country differences can also be a consequence of a simple methodological artifact: range restriction in these differences. As will be illustrated in the next section, a multilevel factor analysis presupposes substantial cross-national score differences. 
	A third possibility is full agreement of individual- and country-level solutions, possibly after a few items or scales that cause a less than optimal fit have been omitted from the comparison. Standard procedures for item bias in exploratory factor analysis (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, b) can be applied to identify these items. Of the three possible outcomes described, only the last one implies structural equivalence at two levels of aggregation; consequently, only in this case the same constructs apply to individual- and country-level data.

Determining Similarity of Meaning across Levels 
Committing (dis)aggregation errors can be avoided by scrupulously restricting interpretations to the level at which data have been collected. There are at least two reasons for rejecting this rigid solution. First, country-level indicators that are derived from individual-level data, such as Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions, are repeatedly and almost unavoidably applied at individual level. After all, they refer to values as individual psychological dispositions, in Hofstede's words (1998, p. 5-6) values are mental programs shared by most members of a society. For example, one of the dimensions, uncertainty avoidance, is described by Smith and Bond (1998) as “a focus on planning and the creation of stability as a way of dealing with life’s uncertainties” (p. 45). Is this a country characteristic? Yes, in the sense that it represents an aggregated individual characteristic, which is ascribed to a country. But it is clearly not a genuine country variable, such as yearly precipitation rate and GNP. It is almost a catch-22 to say that social indicators cannot be applied to the level from which they were clearly derived. Second, as discussed in the remainder of this article, there are statistical tools that can empirically address the nature of the relationship between individual- and country-level characteristics. Neither the rigid refusal to apply any construct at both levels, nor the uncritical application of a construct at different levels of aggregation will advance our knowledge in cross-cultural psychology.
Statistical techniques have been developed to determine whether such errors indeed are committed. Level fallacies (Types III and IV) are examined in hierarchical linear models (e.g., Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1987). The present paper focuses on the first two (Types I and II), which have been dealt with less extensively in the literature. More specifically, we are interested in the question of structural equivalence of constructs at different levels of aggregation. Equivalence refers here to similarity of psychological meaning. When constructs are structurally (or functionally) equivalent at two levels of aggregation, this forms important evidence that they have the same psychological meaning across these levels. If two constructs are not structurally equivalent, (differences in) scores at one level involve partially or entirely different constructs and cannot be interpreted the same way across aggregation levels. 
Multilevel factor analysis (Muthén, 1991) and multilevel covariance structure analysis (Muthén, 1994) have been proposed as methods for examining the psychological meaning of constructs at different levels of aggregation. These techniques compare a data structure at two levels. In Muthén’s confirmatory factor analyses a construct is equivalent across aggregation levels, if a model that postulates the same number of factors at each level and that imposes the same relationship to all variables at both levels, shows a good fit. 
In the process of multilevel factor analysis three covariance matrices play an important role. The first is ST, the common covariance matrix of the total sample (not making any split in cultural groups); the second is SPW, the pooled within covariance matrix, is the (lower-level, disaggregated) covariance matrix based on the separate cultural groups (each weighted by their sample size); the third is SB, the between covariance matrix, the (higher-level, aggregated) covariance matrix, that is computed on the basis of the sample means of the various items. 
The standardization procedures proposed by Leung and Bond (1989) are not applied here. These authors use standardization to eliminate unwanted sources of variation, like differences in response styles. However, standardization procedures that eliminate cross-cultural performance differences preempt a multilevel factor analysis. 
Muthén (1991) discusses as an example a study of student achievement. American eighth graders  (N = 3,724), coming from 197 classes, were given various arithmetic tests (as part of the Second International Mathematics Study). Using confirmatory factor analysis, he found a single model to fit the individual- and class-level data. 
An alternative to Muthén’s techniques is the use of exploratory multilevel factor analysis. The technique is a straightforward generalization of common practice in cross-cultural psychology, in which factor structures obtained in different cultural populations are compared after target rotation of the loadings. The agreement is then evaluated by some factor congruence coefficient, usually Tucker’s phi (Chan, Ho, Leung, Chan, & Yung, 1999; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, b). Analogously, in multilevel analysis separate factor analyses are first carried out on the SPW and SB matrices, followed by a target rotation of one solution to the other. A good agreement points to factorial equivalence at both levels, usually operationalized as a value of Tucker’s phi higher than .90. Nevertheless, this value can be argued to be on the low side (Chan et al., 1999). Van de Vijver and Poortinga (1994) showed in a simulation study that values substantially higher than .90 can still be obtained when one or two items show markedly different loadings on factors with high eigenvalues (factors consisting of many items with high loadings). 
A high agreement implies that the factor loadings of the lower and higher level are equal up to a multiplying constant. (The latter is needed to accommodate the possibly differential reliabilities of aggregated and nonaggregated data.) 
The easiest way to compute the SB matrix is through the use of common statistical packages, such as SPSS and SAS. This can be done by aggregating data using the relevant higher order unit, such as country, as the “break variable” and sample size as weight. Muthén (1991, 1994) has pointed to a problem with this procedure. The SB matrix is a weighted sum of the true between matrix and pooled within matrix. Different computer programs to estimate the (correct) SPW and SB matrices are available (e.g., Muthén, 2000). In empirical data sets problems may arise in working with the between-country matrix. This matrix may not be of full rank, which precludes carrying out a regular factor analysis. It is not completely clear when to expect this  condition. When the number of higher order units (e.g., classes) is high and the number of observations per unit is low (e.g., pupils per class), the SB matrix can contain poor approximations of the real values, which might increase the likelihood of running into problems. Experience shows that whenever two versions of SB matrix (the true values and “simple” matrix containing the values estimated by a common statistical package) are available, similar results are obtained (Muthén, 1994, p. 389). This observation, done within the context of confirmatory factor analysis, probably also holds for exploratory factor analysis, which would imply that one can rely on the “simple” SB matrix whenever needed.
Do we need to develop an approach based on exploratory factor analysis, when statistical theory and a computer program are already available for examining the multilevel structure using confirmatory factor analysis? There are various reasons why this question should be answered positively. First, the introduction of confirmatory factor analysis some decades ago never led to the replacement of exploratory factor analysis, which is a robust technique and, as the name suggests has advantages in exploratory stages of research. A second reason is that some domains of psychology, such as personality, may not show the simple structures that are typically needed in confirmatory factor analysis. Church and Burke (1994) have argued that at least in the personality domain small and psychologically trivial covariances among variables often have to be incorporated in the pattern of factor loadings in order to obtain acceptable fit indices. This conflict between theoretical parsimony and statistical fit is not easy to resolve in confirmatory factor analysis. A third reason we can mention is that the model underlying exploratory factor analysis is adequate for the question we seek to answer, namely whether the data at different levels meet conditions of structural equivalence. Additional features of other models, that can be tested in confirmatory models, such as tests of equivalence of metric properties of scales (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, b) are not relevant for addressing structural equivalence. Finally, structural equivalence is often aimed at the analysis of items and exploratory multilevel factor analysis may be useful when cross-cultural data are analyzed at item level, in which case confirmatory factor analysis often yields poor results (e.g., McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996; a noteworthy counter-example can be found in Byrne & Campbell, 1999). In short, exploratory multilevel factor analysis provides an alternative to a confirmatory model when the latter runs into problems (e.g., poorly fitting data without any clue as to how to solve the problem), or when no a priori factors can be defined.​[1]​
Procedure
	Muthén (1991, 1994) describes a multilevel factor or covariance structure analysis step by step (see also Duncan, Alpert, & Duncan, 1998; Hox, 1993; Li, Duncan, Harmer, Acock, & Stoolmiller, 1998). The present description adapts this procedure for cross-cultural research. The analysis consists of five steps:
1.	Exploratory factor analysis on the total data set (without any split according to country) is carried out, perhaps specifying different numbers of factors in various runs, in order to gain some insight in the factorial structure that will be used in the subsequent analyses. If the within- and between-factor solutions are identical, the factors will be readily retrieved in this step. However, if the two levels have dissimilar factors, the results of this first step may be difficult to interpret due to a confounding of individual- and culture-level factors. Also, if one of the levels has a unifactorial structure while the other level has a multifactorial structure, the single factor may dominate and obscure the presence of the other factors. 
2.	Estimates of the sizes of the cross-cultural differences in the input variables are needed, such as intraclass correlations. Most computer programs provide estimates of effect sizes in their output of analysis of variance programs (such as the proportion of variance accounted for). Minimum values that intraclass correlations should exceed in order to warrant a multilevel analysis, do not exist. Muthén suggests that at least 5% of the variance in the target variables should be due to cross-cultural differences. Low values of intraclass correlations indicate that there are no cross-cultural score differences to be modeled and that it is likely that all samples come from the same population.
3.	The between and pooled-within correlation or covariance matrices are computed. The FORTRAN computer program provided on Muthén’s internet site can be used for the computations. As an alternative, Härnqvist’s (1976) procedure may be adopted, which is less accurate, though computationally simpler (if sample sizes of all groups are the same, the two procedures yield the same results). As another alternative, recent releases of LISREL can also estimate both matrices (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999).
4.	This step attempts to determine whether the pooled-within matrix provides an adequate account of the factor structure found in the various countries. Does the pooled-within structure apply to each country? The question is addressed by carrying out a factor analysis on the pooled-within matrix and on each of the separate countries. The factorial agreement of the factor structures of each of the separate countries with the pooled-within structure is evaluated, after target rotation has been carried out (details can be found in Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997b). Most commonly applied is Tucker’s phi, which (as mentioned) should have a value of at least .90. Although the reasons for any misfit may be a relevant topic for further study, they are beyond the scope of the procedure outlined here. 
It may be noted that this step (which is typically not described in multilevel confirmatory factor analysis) should be carried out, because the pooled-within matrix may not apply to all countries. The last step of our procedure assumes that all countries have high phi values and that countries with low phi values are not further considered.
5.	This last step is the objective of the entire analysis; it compares the structures underlying the pooled-within and between matrices. The question of the similarity of the factors obtained at individual and country level is examined. The loadings of the factors found in the pooled-within and between matrices are compared (after target rotation) by means of Tucker’s phi. A good agreement of the factors at individual and country level provides evidence for the psychological similarity of factors at individual and country level. This outcome may be the implicit aim of the researcher; at the same time, the finding that individual and country differences have a different background may be highly relevant as a demonstration of important, yet poorly understood cross-cultural differences.

Illustration
	An exploratory multilevel factor analysis is illustrated on the basis of the 1990-1991 World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1993, 1997). The study involved a total of 47,871 respondents from the following 39 “regions” (number of respondents in parentheses): Austria (1355), Belarus (912), Belgium (2318), Brazil (1672), Bulgaria (877), Canada (1545), Chile (1368), China (960), (the former) Czechoslovakia (1384), Denmark (892), (the former) East Germany (1226), Estonia (864), Finland (416), France (902), Hungary (886), Iceland (659), India (2150), Ireland (976), Italy (1810), Japan (655), Latvia (720), Lithuania (847), Mexico (1193), Moscow (894), Netherlands (935), Nigeria (954), Northern Ireland (283), Norway (1111), Poland (850), Portugal (976), Russia (1642), South Africa (2480), South Korea (1210), Spain (3408), Sweden (901), Turkey (886), United Kingdom (1356), United States (1688), and (the former) West Germany (1710). 
Attitudes toward postmaterialism were examined. Postmaterialists tend to emphasize self-expression and quality of life as ulterior attitudes, whereas materialists emphasize economic and physical security above all (Inglehart, 1997, p. 4). It is Inglehart’s thesis that with the increase of national affluence, there is a shift from materialist to postmaterialist attitudes. The inventory comprised of 12 items (reproduced in Table 2) that were presented as three quadruplets. For each quadruplet a card was shown to the subject with four values printed on it (e.g., the first four items of Table 2). The instruction was as follows: “There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?” The first rated option got a score of 3, the second of 2, and the remaining options received a score of 1. 
The scoring of the inventory introduces linear dependencies among the data. Each set of values presented on a single card gets a sum score of 7 (being the sum of one score of 3, one score of 2, and two scores of 1). So, the whole instrument has three linear dependencies. Factor analysis may not seem the most appropriate statistical technique here, because of the existence of these dependencies and the, by definition, negative intercorrelations of ipsative scores which may influence the results of a factor analysis. Alternative techniques could be used that are not susceptible to these problems such as multidimensional scaling or unfolding techniques. However, a study by Van Deth (quoted in Inglehart, 1997, p. 123) has shown that for the Inglehart data these techniques show results similar to factor analysis. Therefore, it was decided to apply the latter. Linear dependencies were reduced by omitting one materialist item of each set of four that were jointly presented (see Table 2 for an overview of the selected items). Materialist items were omitted because Inglehart’s thesis primarily involves postmaterialism. 
In the first step (see previous section) exploratory factor analyses were carried out, in order to examine the dimensonality of the total data matrix (not considering any split between countries). There has been some debate in the literature about the dimensionality of the inventory; both unidimensional (e.g., Inglehart, 1997) and bidimensional models (e.g., Herz, 1979; Klages, 1988, 1992, quoted in Inglehart, 1997, pp. 114-116) have been proposed. Our analyses (involving only nine items) provided most support for a unifactorial solution. All items showed sizeable loadings in the expected direction (having absolute values of .35 and higher), with the exception of the item about making cities and countryside more beautiful, which had a loading close to zero. The amount of variance explained by the first factor was modest (24.9%).
The second step of our multilevel factor analysis consisted of the computation of intraclass correlations. The average intraclass correlation was .07 (SD = .03). According to the rule of thumb that the average value should be larger than .05, it can be concluded that the regional differences are sufficiently large for meaningful multilevel modeling. In the third step the between and pooled-within correlation matrices were computed, using Muthén’s program. 
	The fourth step evaluated the appropriateness of the unifactorial structure of the pooled-within data for each of the 39 regions. This was done by computing the agreement of the pooled-within factor loadings (given in Table 3) with the loadings found in one-factorial solutions of the separate regions. A stem-and-leaf display of the agreement indices (Tucker’s phi) has been presented in Table 4. There was one clear outlier: Poland obtained a value of .57. For this country only the items about democracy, maintaining order and the need for a strong defense force showed loadings in line with expectations. The aberrant pattern of the Polish data may be due to societal upheaval. The survey data were collected in 1981, during which time Walesa and Solidarity began to challenge the old communist regime. One other country, Lithuania, obtained a value just below the threshold of .90 while various other regions showed values only slightly higher than .90. 
The stem-and-leaf display suggests that there is large cluster of regions with values of .96 and higher, while there is another cluster with somewhat lower values. A closer inspection revealed that lower phi values were obtained by less affluent regions. The correlation between GNP in 1990 and Tucker’s phi was .32 (p < .05). In a similar vein, the eigenvalue of the factor, which is a measure of the internal consistency of the scale, showed a highly significant correlation of .64 with GNP (p < .001). This points to the conclusion that the concept of postmaterialism becomes better defined with an increase in GNP. 
The same relationship was also examined at item level. Per item, a correlation was computed between the loadings of the item and the regions’ GNP (prior to the analysis the loadings were rescaled per region in order to correct for differences in eigenvalues across regions). As can be seen in Table 5, loadings of only three items were unrelated to GNP (namely “Making sure this country has strong defense forces,” “Protecting freedom of speech”, and  “Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities”). All other correlations were significant. Neither size nor direction of the correlations were related to the item’s position on the continuum. The scatterplots of the relationships revealed a consistent pattern, illustrated for two items in Figure 1: the dispersion of loadings was higher for less affluent than for more affluent regions. There was more disagreement among the less affluent regions about the meaning of the items vis-à-vis postmaterialism than among the more affluent regions. 
	In sum, the analysis of agreement indices showed that almost all regions have factor analytic solutions quite similar to the pooled-within solution. However, upon closer examination, the factor loadings were found to vary with affluence. The question whether the pooled-within solution provides an adequate description of the data of all separate regions did not receive an unconditionally affirmative answer: There is some evidence for the presence of one and the same factor, underlying the nine items of the postmaterialism across the 39 regions. However, the concept gains salience with higher GNP. The relationship between the internal consistency and GNP has implications for the comparison of raw scores on the postmaterialism scale. Differences between regions with high and low GNP may be poorly estimated due to the lower reliability of the scores of the latter countries.
	In the last step of the analysis process, the pooled-within and between matrices were factor analyzed, being the individual and regional level of analysis, respectively. The Polish data were excluded because of the low agreement between the Polish solution and the pooled-within data. This last step constitutes the core of the analysis as it examines the similarity of the construct at two different levels of aggregation. The results have been reported in Table 3. The aggregated data (regional level) showed a higher eigenvalue than the nonaggregated data (individual level) (3.88 and 2.14, respectively). This is hardly surprising as aggregation can be expected to reduce random error. The value of Tucker’s phi was .87, which is rather adequate but still points to sources of bias. The main problem was with the item “Giving people more to say in important government decisions”. The difference in loading on both factors was massive (.64); at individual level the item is a good marker of postmaterialism, but at regional level the item makes hardly any contribution. When the analysis was repeated without this item, Tucker’s phi rose to .95. A second source of bias is the item about trying to make cities and the countryside more beautiful. Whereas at the individual level the loading of the item was almost zero, the item showed a high positive loading at regional level. After elimination of this item, Tucker’s phi increased to .98. 
	Is postmaterialism, as measured by the scale used in the World Values Survey, the same psychological construct at individual and regional level? First of all, in all regions examined (with a single exception) a fairly similar first factor was found, arguing for the structural equivalence of the measure at individual level. However, the construct becomes more salient and is easier to measure in more affluent countries. The agreement of the individual- and regional-level data was fairly high, but some items were found to behave differently at the two levels. So, the present analysis demonstrates that postmaterialism may be a meaningful construct in many regions, but certainly does not allow for numerical score comparisons across regions. The scale only gets a similar meaning at individual and regional level after elimination of some items. In our analyses the item about giving people more influence in government decisions needed to be discarded. In additional analyses in which another set of three items was omitted from the original 12 items (not further reported here) the same item was found to create bias. 

Conclusion
The statistical procedure proposed here can be utilized to examine the structural equivalence of constructs across aggregation levels. Most applications of multilevel models deal with educational data; pupils are nested in classes, that are nested in schools, that are nested in neighborhoods, etc. In these applications similarity of meaning across aggregation levels (though not of score levels) can often be taken for granted, whereas in cross-cultural psychology we usually need to establish this structural equivalence. Without a demonstration of factorial congruence at different levels of aggregation, interpretations become vulnerable to (dis)aggregation fallacies.
McCrae (in press) has recently addressed the structural equivalence of the Five-Factor model of personality at individual and country level. Culture-level scores on the Revised NEO Personality Inventory scales were obtained by averaging all items of a scale in each of 26 cultures. This matrix of average scale scores (with one observation per culture) was factor analyzed. The resulting five country-level factors showed a good resemblance to individual-level factors found in the American norm sample, thereby supporting the similarity of meaning of the factors at individual and country level. There are various, largely technical differences between his and our approach. For example, whereas we first combine all individual-level data in an individual-level pooled matrix, McCrae uses the individual-level American data as normative data. Because the individual-level factors of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory tend to be very stable across cultures, the change of norm groups could not be expected to substantially change the results if our procedure were to be applied on his data. McCrae’s study is interesting, as it constitutes one of the first systematic examinations of cross-level equivalence of psychological concepts.
A major limitation of exploratory multilevel factor analysis is the large number of higher-order units (regions, countries) that are needed to warrant an analysis. Data sets involving many countries are still rare, though their number is steadily increasing. It may be noted that similarity of individual- and country-level structures is assumed in the comparison of any number of countries, even in t tests involving just two countries. What can be done when the number of countries is small? Obviously, a multilevel factor analysis cannot be applied in the case of very few countries. A more rudimentary check on the meaning of country differences is still possible by measuring variables that presumably explain the cross-cultural score differences to be expected. Such variables, called context variables (Poortinga & Van de Vijver, 1987), are used to statistically predict the cross-cultural score differences on the target variables; for example, a measure of social desirability is used to explain cross-cultural differences in assertiveness. Regression procedures can be applied to evaluate to what extent social desirability can “explain away” cross-cultural differences in assertiveness. Compared to multilevel factor analysis, these regression procedures are less exploratory and more aimed at testing alternative interpretations of cross-cultural score differences.  
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Types of Fallacies in Multilevel Research

	Direction of inference







Items of the Postmaterialism Scale (Ingelhart, 1993)
Item	Dimension	Labela
Making sure this country has strong defense forces	Materialism	Defense
Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities	Postmaterialism	Democracy1
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful	Postmaterialism	Cities
Maintaining order in the nation 	Materialism	Order
Giving people more to say in important government decisions	Postmaterialism	Democracy2
Protecting freedom of speech 	Postmaterialism	Free speech
A stable economy 	Materialism	Econ. stab.
Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society 	Postmaterialism	Humane
Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money 	Postmaterialism	Ideas
a. These labels are used in the following Tables.
Note. The materialist items “Maintaining a high level of economic growth,”  “Fighting rising prices,” and “The fight against crime” were not analyzed (see text).
Table 3













Eigenvalue (percentage explained)	    2.14 (23.9%)	    3.88 (43.3%)	
1See Table 2 for a description of the items. 2Diff. is a measure of the difference in factor loadings. It is computed by first multiplying each loading on the pooled-within factor by the square root of the ratio of the between factor to the pooled-within factor and then subtracting the loading of the between factor solution. 
Note. Polish data are not included here, because of the low agreement of the Polish factor solution to the pooled-within factor solution.
Table 4














Each leaf represents one observation (region) 
Table 5



























Democracy2 (r = -.60***)

Cities (r = .51**) 












^1	  In some applications it may be possible to apply both exploratory and confirmatory approaches. The latter may then provide a statistically more adequate test of structural equivalence. Moreover, if the interest is not in structural equivalence but in measurement unit equivalence and full score equivalence (cf. van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, b), confirmatory factor analysis is the only type of factor analysis that can be used. An interesting extension of the confirmatory approach to examine measurement unit and full score equivalence is given in the so-called MACS model (Mean and Covariance Structures; Little, 1997) in which both covariances and means are simultaneously examined.
